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NOTES
respondent must be disbarred, but in case of any other crime the
disbarment would only follow if the court deemed the crime such as
showed him "to be unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession."
By the new amendment disbarment for felony also is subject to this
same restriction, i.e., it must be adjudged that the felony is one
which shows the lawyer its unfit to be trusted. It may be argued
that the standing of the profession was better protected by a rule
which assumed that, regardless of individual professional trust-
worthiness, a convicted felon should be excluded from its ranks.
The other changer is an eminently practical and desirable one.
It confers power on the judge of the Superior Court to institute an
investigation into any reported cause for disbarment or suspension,
and to that end he may appoint three to five lawyers as commis-
sioners with power to summon and examine witnesses. Presumably,
however, the Committee on Grievances must still formally institute
final proceedings for disbarment or suspension, in the class of cases,
stated above, where it was formerly required to do so.
NOTES
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In Edna Ferber's comparatively recent novel, "Show Boat," she
introduced in one incident, a character called "Little Wayne Damron."
The possessor of that name sued the author, the publisher and a book-
seller, claiming a cause of action under sections 50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law. Recovery was not allowed.'
These sections of the statute were passed as the result of the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.2 They provide that the name or picture
of a living person may not be used for purposes of advertising or
trade without his consent.3 They have been strictly construed, the
'Chap. 285, Laws of 1929.
'Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 231 N. Y. S. 444 (1928), commented
on in (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 709.
3171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 59 L. R. A. 378, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902).
(Plaintiff's picture used on a flour advertisement. Injunction denied). This
case aroused a great deal of comment and criticism. The criticism moved
Judge O'Brien, at that time a member of the New York Court of Appeals, who
concurred in Judge Parker's majority opinion, to write a defense of the case
which appeared in (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 437. See also (1901) 1 Col. L. Rev.
491 and (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 486 (comments on the decisions in the Appellate
Division and Court of Appeals respectively).
'The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097 (1908).
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court holding that the statute was aimed chiefly at the situation of
the Roberson case and had to be interpreted in that light.4
As a matter of statutory construction the decision in the instant
case is correct, but it serves to bring 'back into the legal limelight the
question of the right of privacy. The first serious plea for legal
recognition of a right of privacy in this country appeared in an article
by Messrs. Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review.5
Since that time the law reviews have waged a consistent fight for the
acknowledgment of the right.
The judges, however, have been more conservative than the editors,
and American authority is effectively split on the question. The cases
denying the existence of the right have placed 'their decisions on the
following grounds: (1) that there is no precedent;G (2) that it
would subject the courts to a flood of litigation;7 (3) that it would
curtail freedom of speech and of the press;" and (4), in cases where
an injunction was sought, that equity has jurisdiction only where
property rights (on the authority of Gee v. Pritchard)9 or breach
' Thus the instant case says the Roberson case indicates the mischief to be
suppressed. Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. Rep. 570,
124 N. Y. S. 780 (1910) decided the statute did not apply to newspapers.
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752
(1919), held it not applicable to news films. Other cases construing the statute
are Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913); Merle v.
Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 176, 152 N. Y. S. 829 (1915) ;
D'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N. Y. S. 200 (1913) ;
Rosenwasser v. Ogoglio, 172 App. Div. 107, 158 N. Y. S. 56 (1916). See also
(1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 735 and (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 100 (comments on
Humiston case), and note, (1911) 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137.5 The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra note 2; Henry v. Cherry,
30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St. Rep. 928, 18
Ann. Cas. 1006 (1909), commented on in (1909) 9 Col L. Rev. 641 and (1910)
8 Mich. L. Rev. 221; Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac.
594, 35 L. R. A. (N. S) 595 (1912), commented on in (1912) 46 Am. L. Rev.
587 and (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 335, which admits there is a wrong but
says there is no remedy; Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W.
285, 46 L. R. A. 219, 80 Am. St. Rep. 507 (1899). These cases state that
the remedy must come by statute, but the New York Legislature is apparently
the only one which has acted upon the suggestion. See Wilbur Larremore,
The Law of Privacy (1912) 12 Col. L. Rev. 693, suggesting that a statute cover-
ing the advertising cases is comparatively easy to frame, but that in cases
of "absolute privacy" no statutory remedy is feasible.
Cases cited supra note 6.
' Cases cited supra note 6. The Hillman case is really the only one in which
the fact situation justifies a serious discussion of freedom of the press.
*2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818). An injunction was granted, on
the ground of literary property, to restrain the publication of letters written
by the plaintiff to defendant.
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of confidence or trust (on the authority of Prince Albert v. Strange) 0
are involved and cannot protect purely personal rights."'
The cases recognizing the right have answered: (1) that mere
lack of precedent should be no deterrent; that the case only offers
opportunity for a new application of an old principle--the constitu-
tionally-guaranteed right to personal liberty;12 (2) that recognition
of privacy would occasion no more unjustifiable litigation than the
recognition of any other right; that if cases are numerous it will only
indicate the usefulness of the remedy;13 (3) that privacy and free-
dom of speech and of the press are co-existent and compatible, not
mutually exclusive rights ;14 and (4) that the Chancellors in Gee
v. Pritchard and Prince Albert v. Strange, and particularly in the
former instance, merely seized upon the pretext of property rights
101 Macn. & G. 25, 2 De. G. & S. 652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849). Equity
on the grounds of property rights and breach of trust, restrained the publica-
tion of a description of plaintiff's etchings, at least by printing or writing,
though not by copy or resemblance.
" Probably the best analysis of the authorities before 1902, on the side
of strict construction, is to be found in the Roberson case. For a case typical
of the attitude that equity can interfere only where property rights are involved
see Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 24 (1839).. Cf. Mackenzie v. Soder
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N. Y. S. 240 (1891).
' Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R.
A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Am. & Eng Ann. Cas. 561 (1905), commented
on in (1905) 5 Mich. L. Rev. 559; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S. W. 1076 (1911). The Pavesich case states that lack of precedent is not
controlling, attempts to show a precedent by reference to Roman Law and
by drawing analogies to other situations in which the law protects personal
rights, and then brings privacy within the scope of the constitutional guaran-
tees. The Munden case holds that the novelty of the claim is no objection to
granting relief.
" Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., supra note 12. It may be of some
significance that in New York, where the court feared a flood of litigation, and
the Legislature passed a statute covering only a portion of privacy, litigation
has been frequent. In Georgia, on the other hand, where the court recognized
the whole right, only one case has since arisen which really involves the ques-
tion, and that case is not strictly one of privacy. .Stark v. Hamilton, 149
Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861 (1919), commented on in (1920) 5 Cornell L. Q. 177,
where an injunction was granted restraining defendant, who had debauched
plaitiff's minor daughter, from communicating with her in any way. Cf.
Ex parte Warfield, 40 Tex; Crim. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899).
"Cases cited supra note 12; Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W.
967, 55 A. L. R. 964 (1927), commented on in (1928) 13 Cornell L. Q. 469
and (1928) 1 So. Cal. L. Rev. 293. In the advertising cases there is no real
necessity of raising the issue of freedom of the press, and in several sucl'
cases recognizing the right of privacy it has not been seriously raised. Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137,
135 Am. St. Rep. 417 (1909); Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532,
L. R. A. 1918D 115 (1918).
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as a means of protecting the right of privacy in an era when the latter
right was unknown.15
It seems to the writer that the states in which the question has
not yet -been litigated, among which is North Carolina, should have
little difficulty in allowing recovery, when occasion does arise, in at
least one class of cases-those where a person's name or picture has
'been unauthorizedly used for commercial purposes. And this is true
even though they adopt the narrow test of a property right. The
enormous increase in testimonial advertising has demonstrated be-
yond a doubt that a name or picture capable of use in such a connec-
nection is worth money. This economic interest must be recog-
nized, either upon the theory that the plaintiff can sell it himself or
upon the theory that the defendant, by his use of it, has admitted
its value. 16 And if the court wishes to place the decision upon a
This construction was forcibly urged by Messrs. Warren and Brandeis,
op. cit. supra note 5, and in (1927) 25 Mich. L. R. 889. It was adopted by the
Pavesich case, supra note 12. Munden v. Harris, supra note 12, finds a property
right in a picture. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 386, Ann. Cas 1914B 374 (1912) thinks it would be a reproach to
the law if incorporeal injuries could not be recovered for. These cases, how-
ever, are all damage suits and not prayers for injunction. But see the dictum
in Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907), stating that
equity has jurisdiction where property rights are not involved, citing the
Pavesich case as authority.
The question of privacy is only one phase of the battle over property rights
and the construction of Gee v. Pritchard. It involves the wholq field of equitable
jurisdiction over injuries to personality. See, on common law rights to intel-
lectual productions, note (1901) 51 L. R. A. 353 and (1926) 12 Va. L. Rev.
656; and on rights of the owner of a photograph see note (1901) 50 L. R. A.
397 and note (1907) 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 362. On the general subject of rights
of personality (including privacy) see: Pound, Equitable Relief against Defa-
nation and Iniuries to Personality (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640; Long, Equit-
able Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 Yale L. J.'115; Larre-
more, op. cit. supra: note 6; note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 295; note (1897) 37 L. R.
A. 783; (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 889; (1917) 1 Minn. L. Rev. 71; (1920) 5
Cornell L. Q. 177.
' See note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. And Munden v. Harris,
supra note 12, takes the attitude that if peculiarities of a person's appearance
are to be a matter of merchandise it should be for his profit. In contrast with
this is Judge O'Brien's attitude (op. cit. supra note 2) : "A woman's beauty,
next to her virtue, is her earthly crown, but it would be a degradation to hedge
it about by rules and principles applicable to property in land or chattels."
If the present fad for testimonial advertising continues it is conceivable that
plaintiffs will prefer to bring their actions in such cases upon the theory of prop-
erty rather than of privacy because: (1) it will be difficult to convince a jury
that plaintiff has been substantially mortified (except perhaps in cases where
the commodity advertised is of questionable nature) in an era when no stigma
attaches to an appearance in a testimonial capacity; and (2) if the plaintiff
has permitted his name and picture to be used by one advertiser, subsequent un-
authorized use by another will hardly be a serious invasion of privacy but will
involve considerable damage to the property right.
NOTES
broader basis and recognize the right of privacy, it no longer faces an
absence of precedent.
Privacy, however, included more than prevention of commercial
use. The question has arisen in the following illustrative cases: news-
paper, in connection with its story of an indictment for fraud, print-
ing a picture of the suspect's daughter ;17 placing plaintiff's picture
in the rogue's gallery before conviction;18. "shadowing" by private
detectives;19 publishing a biography and picture of the plaintiff's
deceased husband;20 exhibiting a bust of the plaintiff's deceased
relative as the ideal feminine philanthropist ;21 using plaintiff's pic-
ture in an actors' popularity contest;22 placing a large sign in a
garage window stating that the plaintiff owed the owner money ;23
copyrighting pictures of plaintiff's deformed children;24 unauthor-
" Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., supra note 6. No recovery allowed in
suit for damages. Court calls the authority recognizing privacy "instructive."
'Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So 499 (1905), 117 La. 708,
42 So. 228 (1906) ; Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227 (1906).
Injunctions granted in both cases. The right of privacy is apparently assumed,
the court stating that equity will protect such an invasion of private rights,
and that every one who does not violate the law can insist upon being let alone.
The court, however, considers the cases only remotely analogous to cases of
the type of the Roberson case.
" Chapell v. Stewart, 82 Md. .323, 33 Atl. 542, 37 L. R. A. 783 (1896). In-
junction denied, court holding that ordinary processes of law are fully compe-
tent to redress all injuries of this kind and that equity has no jurisdiction to
protect personal rights. But Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, etc. Ins. Co., 151
Wis. 537, 139 N. W. 386, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520 (1913), held that "shadowing"
damaging the plaintiff's reputation constituted a cause of action apart from
physical restraint. The case apparently did not turn on the issue of privacy,
but obviously one of the rights protected by the decision is that of privacy.
C Gorliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (1893), 64 Fed. 280, 31 L. R. A. 283(C. C. D. Mass. 1894). Injunction denied because Corliss was a public
character. Court, by way of -dictum, says that a private individual has the
-right to be protected against the representation of his picture in any form,
and that this is a property as well as a personal right.
'Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 31 L. R. A. 286 (1895). Injunction
denied, court holding that even if privacy exists it is purely personal and abates
with the death of the person; that plaintiff must stand on some injury to him-
self and such cannot be shown by proving that the deceased would have
objected during her lifetime.
'Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. Rep. 290, 26 N. Y. S. 908 (1893). Injunction
granted by Superior Court of .New York City on ground that equity will
protect the right to be let alone. This case is weakened as authority because
it was decided by an inferior court in New York before the decision of the
Robersoq case (which distinguished it).
' Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14. In sending the case back for a new
trial the court held that damages would be recoverable for invasion of privacy.
In cases of this nature a count in libel may usually be joined because there is an
inference that the plaintiff is trying to evade the payment of his just debts.
For cases involving actionable methods of attempting to collect debts see note(1928) 55 A. L. R. 971.
"' Douglas v. Stokes, supra note 15. The children were dead. Defendant,
a photographer, made several photographs above the number he contracted to
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izedly taking pictures of a polar expedition ;25 and filing a false birth
certificate attributing to the plaintiff the fatherhood of an illegiti-
mate child.28
Assuming that the present trend is toward the recognition of
privacy, the ultimate questions, at least in damage suits, become:
what must be alleged to state a cause of action and what proof of
damages is necessary? It seems that special damages need neither
be alleged nor proved 27 (except, perhaps, in the case of a corpora-
tion),28 though they might be shown in aggravation. It is only
necessary to state such facts as show an invasion of privacy and
generally to allege -humiliation and suffering.
Proof of this general allegation of humiliation and mortification
could be furnished by the testimony of the plaintiff himself 29 and
by the testimony of friends and acquaintances concerning their
reaction to the matter in litigation. The injury to privacy is sub-
jective, as distinguished from the objective injury involved in defa-
mation; yet it is undoubtedly true that the spiritual injury arises
out of knowledge of the effect the invasion of privacy will have upon
the minds of others. Hence the testimony of friends should be ad-
missable as evidence from which the jury could infer that the plain-
tiff was humiliated. ° In the last analysis recovery rests upon
make. Damages allowed. The decision is based on breach of confidence, but
the court, in a dictum, says that plaintiff could have recovered had defendant
attempted to exhibit the bodies. Such an action would be based upon the
right of privacy.
'Smith v. Surratt, 7 Alaska Rep. 416 (1926), commented on in (1929) 27
Mich. L. Rev. 353. Injunction denied. This case was a controversy between
the Pathe and International News Services and, though the right of privacy
is expressly raised, the case really smacks more of unfair competition than
of privacy. See infra note 35.
'Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, supra note 15. Injunction granted because of
property rights involved. But the court expressly states that it would grant
relief regardless of the property rights.
This, like most of the law of privacy, was suggested by Warren and
Brandeis. The Pavesich case made it law. It has since been approved by
Munden v. Harris, supra note 12; Foster Milburn Co. v. Chinn; Brents v.
Mort-an: and Kunz v. Allen, all supra note 14.
'This qualification is based on an analogy to defamation. And Vassar
College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1912), in
'refusing an injunction mentioned, among other things, that no special damages
were alleged. See infra note 39.
'This seems fairly obvious, yet in some cases it might be impractical.
For instance, in the case of Munden v. Harris, supra note 12, the plaintiff was
five years old. His age was not discussed in connection with the count for
the invasion of privacy, though it was considered in connection with the count
for libel.
o No direct authority is found to sustain this proposition. The point has
not, apparently, been squarely raised. In Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, supra
note 14, the court held that plaintiff was properly allowed to show that he had
NOTES
whether or not the jury believes the plaintiff actually suffered mor-
tification and mental anguish.3 '
On principle there should be no difference between the action for
damages and the bill in equity insofar as sufficiency of complaint
and proof are concerned. Only two differences are likely to arise.
(1) In an advertising case, if the prayer is for an injunction and an
accounting, whatever is allowed on the accounting would be in the
nature of recovery for profits made by wrongful use of plaintiff's
property rather than in the nature of compensation for injury to plain-
tiff's sensibilities.3 2  (2) In a state where the question first arises in
equity the bill might be demurrable if the court takes the traditional
attitude that equity will not interfere unless the right has been
recognized at law.33 As a practical matter, however, equity has often
set its own standards of conduct in injunction cases. And further,
as heretofore pointed out, there is no longer a lack of legal precedent
recognizing the right.
Certain limitations upon the right were suggested by Messrs.
Warren and Brandeis. These limitations, based upon analogies to
the law of defamation and of literary property, are apparently sound
been ridiculed and laughed at by his friends, such evidence being competent
to show -his mortification. This holding was in connection with the libel
side of the case, but mortification is one of the chief elements of damage in
privacy and hence such evidence should be admissable in privacy actions.
And in Kunz v. Allen, siqprao note 14, the court remarks that the trial judge
unduly limited plaintiff's proof that the publication caused her to be talked
about.
If the witnesses testified, however, that the publication did not lessen their
opinion of the plaintiff it does not follow as a necessary inference that the
plaintiff suffered no damage. This situation arose in the Kunz case and the
court held that it merely proved the sincerity of the friendship entertained by
the witnesses for the plaintiff.
' In Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, the court, in remanding the cause
for a new trial, outlined an instruction for the jury providing, in substance,
that if the jury believed that the plaintiff actually suffered "mental pain, humil-
iation and mortification' they should allow recovery. In Schuyler v. Curtis,
supra note 21, however, one of the grounds for refusing an injunction was that
the defendants had done nothing which would affect unpleasantly the mental
condition of any "sound, reasonable, lintelligent man or woman." But
damages in privacy should be based on actual injury, as in the Brents case,
and not on reasonability. And the jury will, of its own accord, place enough
restraint upon recovery by way of demanding reasonability. See Larremore,
op. cit. supra note 6.
"If the accounting is allowed, thus recognizing the property right, it will
bring the case within even the narrow test of Gee v. Pritchard. And such
allowance of an accounting will furnish an additional reason why plaintiffs
will prefer to bring their actions on the theory of property rights. See note 16,
sup ra.
' For a general discussion of equity's jurisdiction and attitude in tort
cases see Chafee, Does Equity Follow the Law of Torts? (1926) 75 Pa. L
Rev. 1.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and have found considerable favor. 4  They are: (1) privacy does
not prohibit publication of matter which is of general or public
interest;35 (2) privacy does not prohibit publication under circum-
stances which would render it privileged under the law of defama-
tion; 36 (3) there should be no redress for an oral publication unless
special damages be shown; (4) the right ceases upon publicatiQn by
the individual or with his consent;87 (5) truth of the matter pub-
lished is no defence;38 (6) absence of malice is no defence. To
these should be added the limitation that some distinction should be
drawn between individual and corporate privacy.89 And, carrying
the analogy to defamation a little further, it may be supposed that
proof of actual malice would vitiate the defence of privilege.
It has been suggested that recognition of privacy will open up too
-broad a field and put the courts to the necessity of having to exclude
many cases; and that the most effective way to handle the matter
would be to have an action for "wrongful publicity" causing senti-
Practically every case recognizing the right of privacy cites the Warren-
Brandeis article. And Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, takes up each of the
limitations and expressly approves them.
"5 Thus a man who has become a public character to some extent sacrifices
his right of privacy. Corliss v. Walker, supra note 20. Objection has been
made to this on the grounds of difficulty of application. But certainly it will
be no harder to apply than the negligence test. The test is essentially one for
the jury and should be whether, under the circumstances, the publication is
legitimate because of the plaintiff's connection with public life or an event
of public interest. For a case involving an event of public interest see Smith
v. Surratt, supra note 25, holding that there is no right of privacy where
a polar expedition is involved. In general see Larremore, op. cit. mpra note 6
and (1912) 10 Mich. L. Rev. 335. This limitation should be of no importance
in the advertising cases.
"There is apparently no direct authority on this. However, in Folsom v.
Marsh, 2 Story 100, Fed. Cas. No. 4, 901 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841), in a case
involving property rights in letters, the court recognizes that the recipient may
publish them to vindicate his character or to establish a legal right.
' Such consent need not be express; it may be implied. Munden v. Harris,
supra note 12.
"In Brents v. Morgan, supra note 14, the court allowed recovery for inva-
sion of privacy though a statute made truth a defence to libel in every case.
This is the greatest difference between defamation and privacy, and privacy
offers a welcome loop-hole by which to escape the ironclad rule of justification
in the law of defamation. See Wettach, Recent Developments in Newspaper
Libel (1928) 7 N. C. L. Rev. 3, 11.
"There may be some doubt as to whether a corporation has a right of pri-
vacy. Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., supra note 28, apparently
the only case in which the plaintiff is a corporation, denied the existence of any
right of privacy and hence did not discuss the secondary question. Obviously,
however, a corporation cannot suffer humiliation and mortification in the same
sense that an individual can. If it is to be given a right of privacy such right
must be a limited one. Probably it should be limited to cases where the cor-
porate name was being illegitimately employed, where the law of unfair compe-
tition would not offer redress, and where special damages could be shown.
NOTES
mental injury, which would include defamation and a properly limited
privacy.4 0 This suggestion is hardly practical. Defamation and
privacy are closely related and supplementary, but they would hardly
make good bedfellows. Any attempt to combine the two immediately
meets the difficulties that truth is a defence in defamation and that
equity will not enjoin a libel. If these distinctions are kept then there
is no advantage to be gained from the fusion; if they are not kept
then the fusion results in an upheaval in the law of defamation
which will be much more shocking to the legalistic mind than the
mere recognition of privacy. And to give a "wrongful publicity"
action merely as a limited right of privacy, exclusive of the question
of defamation, would serve only to make a somewhat arbitrary divi-
sion of a general right, would meet with the same difficulties now
confronting the growth of the law of privacy, and would probably
result in the exclusion of more than one legitimate case unfortunate
enough to differ in degree though not in kind. The best solution
seems to be to continue along the trail now blazed by authority.
HENRY BRANDIs, JR.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS AS EVIDENCE
Long ago, the poet Horace spoke of the greater effect of that
which is seen than of that which is described by words.' There
are three ways of appealing to the eyes of the jury: (1) by produc-
tion of the "primary real evidence", 2 a thing or object for the per-
"Note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991. The argument is that the phrase,
"wrongful publicity" presupposes that there are forms of publicity which are
not actiqnable, and thus the field is limited.
"'Aut agitur res in scenis, aut acta refertur,
Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, et quae
Ipse sibi sibi tradit spectator' (Horatius ad Pisones)."
See Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175, 179. For effective use of photographs
in disputed document cases, see OsBoaR, THE PROBLEm OF PROOF (1922). In gen-
eral, see 2 WIGMoaR, EVmENCE, ch. 37, p. 1344, "Autoptic Proference."
" The classification by Bentham of all evidence into real evidence, as the evi-
dence of things, and personal evidence as that of persons, has inaugurated a
long train of errors in the theory of proof: see GULSON, PHILOSOPHY OF
PROOF. (2d Ed. 1923). Mr. Gulson says real evidence differs from per-
sonal only in the mode in which a fact is laid before the tribunal. "It is evi-
dence obtained by the court through the mere exercise of its own perceptive
faculties, while 'personal' as defined by Mr. Best, is the evidence acquired
through the perceptions of other persons or witnesses, who report or com-
municate their experience to, the tribunal."
"Primary evidence" of a thing is the term applied by our jurists to the real
evidence of its own nature afforded by the production in court of the thing
or document itself; any other mode of proving the terms of the document
or the nature of the thing being designated by the phrase "secondary evidence":
GutsoN, PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF. (2 Ed. 1923), p. 258.
